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On many of the staple measures of comparative psychology, elephants show no obvious differences from other mammals, 
such as primates:  discrimination learning, memory, spontaneous tool use, etc.  However, a range of more naturalistic mea-
sures have recently suggested that elephant cognition may be rather different. Wild elephants sub-categorize humans into 
groups, independently making this classification on the basis of scent or colour. In number discrimination, elephants show 
no effects of absolute magnitude or relative size disparity in making number judgements. In the social realm, elephants 
show empathy into the problems faced by others, and give hints of special abilities in cooperation, vocal imitation and per-
haps teaching.  Field data suggest that the elephant’s vaunted reputation for memory may have a factual basis, in two ways. 
Elephants’ ability to remember large-scale space over long periods suggests good cognitive mapping skills. Elephants’ skill 
in keeping track of the current locations of many family members implies that working memory may be unusually devel-
oped, consistent with the laboratory finding that their quantity judgements do not show the usual magnitude effects.
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Although the cognitive revolution was slow in coming to 
animal behaviour, in the last twenty years our understanding 
of animal cognition has advanced considerably. In particular, 
the highly social non-human primates have been the focus 
of intense interest, and research in comparative cognition 
has recently expanded to other large-brained and often so-
cial taxa, such as corvids (Bugnyar, 2002; Bugnyar & Hein-
rich, 2005; Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Emery & Clayton, 
2001, 2004), cetaceans (Connor, 1999; Herman, 1986; Reiss 
& Marino, 2001; Rendell & Whitehead, 2001), and social 
carnivores (Hare, Brown, Williamson, & Tomasello, 2003; 
Holekamp, 2006; Manser, Seyfarth, & Cheney, 2002; Mik-
losi, Topal, & Csanyi, 2004).  Here we review what is known 
about the cognition of another large-brained and highly so-
cial group – elephants. Research conducted specifically into 
elephant cognitive abilities is still a fledgling enterprise, but 
we consider what we do and do not know, and compare the 
observable pattern with what we know about the best-stud-
ied mammalian group, the primates.
 Relative to their body size, the brain size of elephants is 
large, although not in the extreme range of humans or dol-
phins. The encephalization quotient varies between 1.3 and 
2.3, depending on species (Cutler, 1979; Jerison, 1973), 
comparable indices to those of apes (Eisenberg, 1981). En-
cephalization gives a useful measure of investment in brain 
tissue relative to metabolic energy available in total, and 
thus indicates the cost to the animal of so large a brain (By-
rne, 1996). It does not, however, give the best indication of 
‘brain-power’: as with any computational system, to assess 
power it is the actual number of processing units available 
for use that is important (Byrne, 1996). Elephants have the 
largest absolute brain size among land animals: up to 5.5 
kg in Asian elephants and up to 6.5 kg in African savannah 
elephants (Cozzi, Spagnoli, & Bruno, 2001; Shoshani, Kup-
sky, & Marchant, 2006). Although neurons are less densely 
packed in elephant brains than in primates’, elephant brains 
nevertheless contain as many cortical neurons as do human 
brains (Roth & Dicke, 2005). Moreover, the pyramidal neu-
rons are larger than in humans and most other species, with 
a large dendritic tree giving the potential for many more 
connections, and perhaps hinting at superior learning and 
memory skills (Cozzi, et al., 2001). 
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 There is a considerable body of theory and supportive data 
to suggest that living in an extensive social network often 
correlates with, and likely promotes, cognitive sophistica-
tion (Byrne & Bates, 2007). To judge by the well-studied 
African elephant Loxodonta africana, elephant society may 
be one of the most elaborate discovered among mammals or 
birds. Elephant ranging is fission-fusion in nature:  female 
matrilineal relatives and dependent offspring form family 
units that usually travel, forage and socialize together, but 
these family units can split up into smaller groups with ir-
regular composition and can also join with members of other 
families to form larger groups (Moss, 1988). It is therefore 
possible that each individual elephant knows and differenti-
ates among several hundred other individual elephants, far 
in excess of anything found in non-human primates. It has 
also often been suggested that superior primate intelligence 
derives from the technical sophistication that is allowed by 
prehensile hands, and the flexible motor control of the hands 
and fingers found especially in apes (Deacon, 1997; Napier, 
1962). On this theory, also, a case may be made that the el-
ephant might possess special abilities. The elephant’s trunk 
is prehensile, and under exquisite brain control (Shoshani, 
et al., 2006), such that it can pick up and put down an egg 
without breaking it.   
 The large brains, societal complexity and advanced pre-
hension of elephants have evidently evolved in parallel with 
those of primates. Elephants belong to the Afrotheria (Hedg-
es, 2001; Murphy, et al., 2001), an ancient placental group 
that evolved between 105 and 40 Mya when the continent 
of Africa was isolated from other land masses. Among their 
closest relatives, elephants number golden moles, tenrecs, 
dugongs and elephant-shrews—Afrotheria is not a lineage 
in which large brains or social complexity are conspicuous. 
This means that if the cognitive abilities of elephants prove 
to resemble in any way those of humans, we can be sure that 
the resemblance results from convergent evolution rather 
than primitive retention. This, in turn, would enable more 
confident identification of the ecological contexts that pro-
mote these cognitive skills. Conversely, if elephant abilities 
prove wholly strange to those we are familiar with from the 
study of humans and other primates, understanding elephant 
cognition will broaden our knowledge of cognitive process-
es in general. It would seem that elephant cognition is an 
obvious topic for the highest priority.
 Yet, to our knowledge, only 21 papers that describe spe-
cific attempts to assess elephant cognitive skills have to date 
been published in peer-reviewed scientific journals (see Ap-
pendix 1 for a list).  Elephant vocal and chemical communi-
cation systems have been more extensively studied, but the 
cognitive implications of this work are usually not drawn 
out. Most of what is known about elephant behaviour comes 
either from structured observational studies of free-rang-
ing African savannah populations, or from the anecdotes of 
people working with Asian elephants that are held in semi-
captive conditions for use in the logging industry. Both 
observational studies and anecdotal reports have provided 
many examples of behaviors that appear to reflect advanced 
cognitive processing, but often without appropriate control 
observations. In this paper, we attempt to bring these differ-
ent sources of information together to provide an evaluation 
of what can so far be judged of elephant cognitive skills, 
and what needs to be examined in the future. Given the cur-
rent paucity of studies designed specifically to test elephant 
cognition, all conclusions that we draw must be treated as 
tentative and requiring further verification.
 In order to organize this somewhat patchy information, we 
turn to current knowledge of what must be the best-studied 
order of mammals: the primates.  The most comprehensive 
review of primate cognition remains that of Tomasello and 
Call (1997). Although the literature it evaluates is now a de-
cade out of date, we borrow their organisation as a structure 
on which to hang our review of elephant cognition, allowing 
for straightforward comparison. (Note that this categoriza-
tion may not truly reflect the organisation of the underly-
ing cognitive apparatus.)  Also like those authors, we take a 
cognitive approach in theorizing, throughout. In many of the 
cases we review, post hoc associative accounts could also 
be constructed; but we consider that formalism an unhelpful 
one for comparing animal abilities, particularly when flex-
ible and sophisticated  behaviour is deployed in real-world 
environments (see Byrne & Bates, 2006).
Elephant perceptual systems
 Perception and cognition are intimately linked, and since 
elephants are so distantly related to primates (and indeed to 
any of the species traditionally studied in the psychologist’s 
laboratory), we first provide a brief overview of what is so-
far known of their capacities. 
 Elephants are dichromats, with the same colour vision 
pigments as human colour-blind deutaneropes (Yokayama, 
Takenaka, Agnew, & Shoshani, 2005). With a greater con-
centration of rods than cones, their eyesight is thought to be 
good in dull light, but considerably reduced in bright light, 
reaching a maximum range of 46 m (Sikes, 1971). Certain-
ly, their eyesight is good enough to detect the sometimes 
subtle postural displays that appear to be very important to 
elephants, such as ear-flapping, ear folding and trunk curl-
ing (Kahl & Armstrong, 2000). Elephants are also extremely 
tactile animals, frequently touching one another using their 
trunk, ears, tusks, feet, tail, and whole body. Tactile interac-
tions between elephants can occur in aggressive, defensive, 
affiliative, sexual, playful and exploratory contexts. How-
ever, it is the olfactory and auditory senses that are generally 
considered to be the most significant to elephants, for obvi-
ous physical reasons. 
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 Elephants are capable of producing different sounds rang-
ing from 5 Hz to over 9,000 Hz (Poole & Granli, 2003) 
resulting in a broad range of vocalizations from very low 
frequency rumbles to higher frequency trumpets and barks 
(Berg, 1983). However, elephants are specialists in the pro-
duction of low frequency sound, with the most often pro-
duced vocalizations being low frequency rumbles; the low-
est, infrasonic, components of these rumbles can be between 
one and two octaves below the lower limit of human hearing 
(Poole & Granli, 2003). Although the lower range limit of 
elephants’ hearing has not been established, they are known 
to be more sensitive to low frequency sounds, and less so the 
high frequency sounds, than any other mammal so far tested 
(Heffner & Heffner, 1982).
 Elephant groups are frequently highly dispersed; with 
groups often spread over 100m in diameter and, due to the 
fission-fusion social organisation, kin sub-groups can often 
be separated by several kilometers. Elephants use their low 
frequency rumbles such as contact calls to communicate 
over these long distances (Payne, Langbauer, & Thomas, 
1986); these low frequency sounds are known to travel over 
10km in optimal conditions (Garstang, Larom, Raspet, & 
Lindeque, 1995). 
 When an elephant rumbles, a replica of the airborne sound 
is also transmitted through the ground. Elephant sounds have 
been measured as travelling at 309 m per second through 
air and at 248-264 m/sec through the ground (O’Connell-
Rodwell, Arnason, & Hart, 2000). Recent evidence suggests 
that elephants are able to detect these seismic vibrations, or 
Rayleigh waves, through two possible means: bone con-
duction and the use of massive ossicles of their middle ears 
(Reuter, Nummela, & Hemila, 1998), or possibly by mecha-
noreceptors such as Pacinian corpuscles in the toes or feet 
that are sensitive to vibrations (O’Connell, Hart, & Arnason, 
1998).
 Olfaction and chemical communication is also very impor-
tant to elephants. Within the nasal cavity are seven turbinates 
(dogs only have five), scrolls of bones with sensitive tissues 
specialized for olfaction and hormone detection, containing 
millions of olfactory receptor cells (Shoshani, 1997). An el-
ephant may be able to gain enough information by sniffing, 
but if not it will collect the substance on the tip of trunk and 
pass it to the Jacobson’s or vomeronasal organ on the roof 
of the mouth for further analysis, behaviour known as the 
flehmen response.  
 Sources of odours used in chemical communication be-
tween elephants include urine, faeces, saliva and secretions 
from the temporal gland, a large multi-lobed sac with an ori-
fice mid-way between the ear and eye (Langbauer, 2000; Ras-
mussen & Krishnamurthy, 2000). Elephants can frequently 
be seen to raise their trunks up in the air to smell, or use 
the tips of their trunks to explore the ground, for urine spots 
Figure 1. At Amboseli, researchers can recognize over 1400 elephant individuals. Often the ears give the first clues to an 
individual’s identity: overall shape, the pattern of veins and damage to the edges all differ. Photograph by the authors.
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and faecal matter, as well as the genitals, temporal glands, 
or mouths of other elephants (Rasmussen & Krishnamurthy, 
2000). 
Knowledge of physical environment
Space and objects
 Extensive research has been carried out on how primates 
understand objects in their immediate environment, includ-
ing object permanence and the ability to track hidden dis-
placements; however, these topics have not been studied in 
elephants, so no useful comparison can be made. When it 
comes to the understanding of large-scale space, involving 
memory for and navigation within areas that cannot be ap-
prehended from a single viewpoint, there are data for both 
species.
 It has long been suspected that primates possess powerful 
and efficient ‘cognitive mapping’ skills (Mackinnon, 1978; 
Milton, 1981), but only in the last few years have strong tests 
been made (Janson & Byrne, 2007).  Experimental studies 
have shown that capuchin monkeys are able to head directly 
for distant locations, and choose the most valuable to visit 
first (Janson, 2007); however, they do not compute routes 
that show efficiency over more than one target (i.e. solve 
‘the travelling salesman problem’).  Observations of ba-
boons have shown some ability in this direction, however: 
baboons take direct routes to distant, high quality resources 
that are likely to be exploited by other groups, returning later 
to consume other, more reliable resources by-passed earlier 
(Noser & Byrne, 2007b). 
 All primates whose travel has been mapped utilize a net-
work of familiar routes, whether these are arboreal runways 
or terrestrial paths. The impression of limited spatial mem-
ory that this hints at may be misleading, however; when 
tamarins switched from their year-round fruit diet to feed 
on nectar, they travelled from tree to tree along quite differ-
ent routes to their usual ones, routes that were highly direct 
(Garber, 1988). A similar navigational efficiency was earlier 
noted in orangutans; when a favoured fruit crop failed and 
individuals had to visit several trees, far apart in rainforest, 
their travel was a least-effort route (Mackinnon, 1978). These 
performances are often taken to imply Euclidian knowledge 
of space; but an alternative exists, a richly interconnected 
‘network-map’ that allows efficient search from any loca-
tion to any other (Byrne, 2000).  Evidence that primate spe-
cies do indeed rely on network-maps, rather than Euclidian 
knowledge equivalent to a 2D paper map, has come from 
both humans and baboons (Byrne, 1979; Noser & Byrne, 
2007a). Primate route planning goes beyond spatial informa-
tion: mangabeys have been shown to take into account the 
likely effect of warm, sunny weather on ripening fruit (Jan-
maat, Byrne, & Zuberbuhler, 2006). When passing close to a 
tree which held unripe fruit on their last visit, their decision 
whether to check the tree depends on the weather since their 
last visit: nor is this an effect of more enthusiastic ranging on 
warm sunny days, as the effect persisted when the conditions 
on the day of travel were statistically controlled. 
 Although the logistics of studying elephants in the field 
are entirely different to those in studying primates, there are 
nevertheless some data on which to make comparison with 
the primate picture. 
 African savannah elephants are known to move over very 
large distances in their search for food and water. Leggett 
(2006) used GPS collars to track the movements of elephants 
living in the Namib desert. He recorded one group living 
in the Namib desert travelling over 600 km in five months, 
and Viljoen (1989) showed that elephants in the same region 
visited water holes, some of which were over 60 km apart, 
approximately every four days. Even more impressively, el-
ephants inhabiting the deserts of northern and southern Af-
rica have been described travelling hundreds of kilometres 
to arrive at remote water sources shortly after the onset of a 
period of rainfall (Blake, Bouche, Rasmussen, Orlando, & 
Douglas-Hamilton, 2003; Viljoen, 1989), sometimes along 
routes that researchers believe have not been used for many 
years. These remarkable feats suggest exceptional cognitive 
mapping skills, reliant on the long-term memories of older 
individuals who travelled that path sometimes decades ear-
lier. Indeed, a recent study has confirmed that family groups 
with older matriarchs are better able to survive periods of 
drought (Foley, Pettorelli, & Foley, 2008).  Families with 
older matriarchs range over larger areas during droughts, 
apparently drawing on the knowledge of the older females 
about the locations of permanent, drought-resistant sources 
of food and water.
 However, we cannot yet draw firm conclusions about the 
cognitive mapping skills of elephants, as data are restricted 
to field observations for which the strength of evidence is not 
entirely apparent. For example, we now know that elephants 
can detect low frequency rumbles at distances of several 
kilometeres (Garstang, et al., 1995; Langbauer, 2000), and 
can even detect seismic rumbles (O’Connell-Rodwell, et al., 
2006), so it may be that elephants can follow the sounds of 
distant thunder to reach fresh water sources. Further inves-
tigation is required to determine how well this hypothesis 
accounts for the long-range movements of elephants. There 
are currently several study populations of African savannah 
elephants where the movements of multiple individuals are 
being accurately mapped with GPS tracking devices, so fu-
ture insight into elephant cognitive mapping skills can be 
expected. 
 On a much smaller spatial scale, we recently showed that 
elephants are able to track the relative positions of their fam-
ily members (Bates, et al., 2008b).  We moved urine deposits 
from known individuals to positions where they would be 
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discovered by target individuals. With samples from indi-
viduals who were at least 1 km away, urine from kin pro-
duced significantly more interest from the target individual 
than samples from unrelated individuals. We also presented 
test elephants with urine deposits from related individuals 
actually present in their group that day, which were either 
walking some way ahead of the target elephant or behind 
it. We reasoned that if elephants are able to identify specific 
individuals from their urine, and each is continually updat-
ing its memory of where other key individuals are, then dis-
covering a fresh urine deposit from an individual who was 
walking behind should violate its expectations. Target indi-
viduals investigated samples from family members behind 
them at the time of the test, significantly more than samples 
from individuals who were in front. From this, we concluded 
that elephants are able continually to track the locations of 
family members in relation to themselves, as either absent, 
present in front, or present behind (Bates, et al., 2008b). 
These results suggest that elephants are able to hold in mind 
and regularly update information about the locations of at 
least 17 other female party members, as well as implying 
that they recognize individual identity from scent and have 
some understanding of invisible displacement and person 
permanence. (We tested only scents of adult females, but 
it is presumably likely that individuals keep track of males 
and some immatures in addition.) That they can keep track 
of so many, independently moving companions implies that 
elephants have particularly large working memory capacity.
Tools and causality
 With their opposable thumbs, primates are adept at object 
manipulation (Beck, 1980), with great apes having the great-
est manual dexterity (Byrne, Corp, & Byrne, 2001; Napier, 
1962). Tool use is widespread among animals, and is evident 
in all great apes and several monkey species (Beck, 1980). 
Tool use itself is not necessarily indicative of advanced cog-
nitive processing, however. Instead, systematic tool manu-
facture or modification is recognised as cognitively more 
demanding, and is evident in only a handful of species: all 
four great apes in captivity (McGrew, 1989), though only 
chimpanzees and orangutans in the wild (Fox, Sitompul, & 
Van Schaik, 1999; McGrew, 1992); and the New Caledonian 
crow (Hunt, 1996, 2000b). 
 Both Asian and African savannah elephants have been 
seen to use multiple tool types for up to six different func-
tions, mostly in the context of body care such as scratching 
and removing ticks, with one report of throwing mud during 
a competitive encounter with a rhino over access to a water-
hole (Chevalier-Skolnikoff & Liska, 1993; Wickler & Seibt, 
1997). Asian elephants presented with branches that were 
too long or bushy to make effective fly switches (fly-swats), 
a commonly used tool, modified them before use by either 
breaking off a side branch or snapping them in half (Hart, 
Hart, McCoy, & Sarath, 2001). Elephants may thus be added 
to the small number of animals that make tools. However, 
for an animal that frequently breaks branches while eating, 
the cognitive demands of extending this behaviour to manu-
facture fly switches are probably not great (Bates, Poole, & 
Byrne, 2008). Elephant tool modification does not compare 
in complexity to the manufacture of ant and termite dipping 
tools displayed by chimpanzees (Boesch & Boesch, 1990; 
Goodall, 1986), which even includes making two different 
types of tool for different stages of the same task (Sanz & 
Morgan, 2007); or with the serrated leaf probes and hook 
tools produced by New Caledonian crows (Hunt, 1996, 
2000a).
 Detecting causal reasoning in animals has, understand-
ably, been a more elusive target. Several primate species 
have proved able to choose tools on the basis of relevant 
properties, even species like tamarins which do not naturally 
use tools (Hauser, 1997; Santos, Miller, & Hauser, 2003). 
Chimpanzees also gave evidence of some sort of causal 
understanding, when showing selectivity in what to copy 
(Horner & Whiten, 2005). When presented with opaque 
puzzle boxes, chimpanzees copied two actions made by a 
human demonstrator to release food. When the same boxes 
were transparent, revealing that one action was irrelevant, 
they missed it out and copied only the relevant action. The 
judgement of relevance, however, may have been based on 
a simple parameter.  For instance, because the ‘irrelevant’ 
action made no physical contact with the food, the chimpan-
zees may only have attended to whether contact was made 
when they choose which actions to copy.  Even chimpanzees 
have not performed impressively when confronted with a 
‘trap tube’ task, in which poking the desired food item from 
the wrong side causes it to fall into a well and be lost (Li-
mongelli, Boysen, & Visalberghi, 1995); the few individuals 
that solved the task did so only over several trials, raising 
concerns that they did not understand the issue. In contrast, 
rooks Corvus frugileus, another crow species that does not 
regularly use tools in the wild, solved the task rapidly and 
one individual showed immediate transfer to a different task 
that relied on the same basic insight (Seed, Tebbich, Emery, 
& Clayton, 2006).
 Evidence of causal understanding in elephants is sparse. 
Nissani (2004) reports a string pulling experiment and a tube 
task conducted with two zoo-based female Asian elephants. 
The elephants were required to pull a retractable cord in or-
der to obtain a food reward in the first experiment, and suck 
or blow through a tube to gain a reward in the second. Of the 
two subjects, one performed reasonably well, the other less 
so, and careful analysis of the pattern of results suggested 
that performance was dependent on trial and error learning, 
rather than an understanding of the causal relationships be-
tween the action and the outcome. Nissani also reported an 
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learn the correct target, showing that she developed a learn-
ing set as do Old World monkeys and apes (Passingham, 
1981). The elephant was re-tested with the same visual dis-
crimination pairs after a one-year delay, and she performed 
with 73-100% accuracy.   As well as straightforward discrim-
ination learning, there was some evidence that the elephant 
could transfer what she had learned about the features of the 
positive stimulus, and apply it correctly to novel stimuli. For 
example, she appeared to generalize over orientation. In the 
initial tests a + symbol was the correct choice; when subse-
quently presented with an x symbol for the first time, she im-
mediately recognised it as correct. Generalization over size 
was also shown. The elephant was initially asked to discrim-
inate between two stimuli showing black and white stripes, 
with the bands placed 2cm apart in the positive stimulus and 
4cm apart in the negative stimulus. At a later date she was 
presented with novel striped stimuli, this time with the spac-
ing either 1.5cm or 2cm. She chose the correct stimulus of 
the thinnest stripes – 1.5cm, even though in previous trials 
the 2cm stripes had been the correct choice. However, with 
only two such examples in this paper, it is difficult to draw 
firm conclusions. In contrast to Rensch’s paper, a discrimi-
nation task conducted on working Asian elephants (Nissani, 
Hoefler-Nissani, Tin Lay, & Wan Htun, 2005) reported that 
some of the 20 animals tested never learnt to pass the tests 
although others did perform comparably to the young female 
tested by Rensch. There was an age effect in these results, 
however, with more individuals over the age of 20-30 years 
unable to acquire the discriminations.
  We conducted a field experiment in the Amboseli National 
Park, Kenya, that may be seen as a more ecologically valid 
test of elephant feature learning and categorization, present-
ing individually known elephants with garments that gave 
either visual or olfactory information about their human 
wearers (Bates, et al., 2007). We used garments that had 
been worn by members of two different ethnic groups that 
pose different levels of danger to elephants. In the first set 
of trials, we separately presented elephant groups with three 
different red cloths, using a within-subjects design. Each of 
the cloths had been worn either by a Masaai warrior, or a 
similar aged man from the agricultural Kamba tribe, or by no 
one at all. The only thing that differed between the cloths was 
therefore the smell, derived from the ethnicity or lifestyle of 
the wearers.  With access only to this olfactory information, 
the elephants showed significantly greater flight reactions to 
garments worn by Masaai warriors than similar age Kamba 
men. In a second experiment, elephants in the same popula-
tion were presented with two cloths that had not been worn 
by anyone, but here one was white - a neutral stimulus, and 
the other was red - the colour that is ritually worn by Masaai 
warriors. With access only to these visual cues, the elephants 
showed significantly greater reactions to garments worn by 
Masaai warriors than similar age Kamba men, often includ-
apparent lack of causal understanding by working Asian el-
ephants, in dealing with a modified discrimination task (Nis-
sani, 2006). The subjects were trained to remove food from 
a bucket only after they had touched the bucket lid, which 
during training was always placed on top of the bucket.  In 
the test phase, the lid was placed next to the bucket instead 
of on top of it, so there was no need to touch it before ac-
cessing the food. Only in 3 of 77 trials did any elephants 
ignore the lid and reach straight into the bucket for the food. 
On the other trials, the elephants touched or even threw the 
lid away, as they had previously been trained to do.  Nissani 
argued that this showed a lack of causal understanding by 
the elephants, but it might instead represent a lack of under-
standing of the task demands. Working elephants are trained 
from an early age to follow precise sequences of behaviour, 
and are punished for any deviation. Thus, in trials where the 
lid was placed next to the bucket, the subjects may have seen 
that the lid was now irrelevant, but nevertheless interpreted 
the task as one of following the trained practise. Until this 
experiment is repeated on animals that are normally allowed 
to exercise their behavioural choices freely, we should prob-
ably not draw conclusions about elephants’ lack of causal 
understanding from it. 
 Indeed, some understanding of physical causality is sug-
gested by the results of testing elephants on a well-known 
Piagetian task that depends on an understanding of the con-
cept of support (Irie-Sugimoto, Kobayashi, Sato, & Hasega-
wa, 2008). Elephants were given a series of problems in each 
of which food bait was out of reach; but in some cases a bait 
item was supported by a tray which the elephant was able to 
pull. In all cases, one of the two elephants tested performed 
above chance in selecting the correct tray to pull, showing 
that it took a means-end approach to the problem and had 
some understanding of the notion of physical support. 
Discrimination learning, features and categories
 Tomasello and Call (1997) review extensive evidence 
that apes and monkeys are generally adept at learning fea-
ture discriminations and categories, both natural and artifi-
cial, In this, they do not differ from pigeons and rats, the 
animals more typically used in animal learning laboratories. 
Evidence suggests that elephants are similarly capable of 
discrimination learning, and moreover, that they have clas-
sification abilities that may exceed those of many animals. 
 One of the first systematic tests of elephants’ discrimina-
tion learning ability was conducted by Rensch (1957) as he 
explored the long-term retention of a captive Asian elephant. 
Rensch taught a juvenile female Asian elephant 20 different 
visual discrimination pairs and six acoustic discrimination 
pairs; one pattern of each pair was rewarded. It took the fe-
male 330 trials to learn the first visual discrimination, but by 
the fourth and subsequent pairs it took her only ten trials to 
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ing signs of aggression. We concluded that elephants are 
able to categorize a single species (humans) into subclasses, 
an ability that relies on sophisticated discrimination learning 
and classification (Bates, et al., 2007). 
 The numerous vocal, gestural, and chemical signals used 
by elephants also suggest considerable classification abili-
ties in elephants. Over a hundred different gestural displays 
have been described for African elephants (Kahl & Arm-
strong, 2000; Poole & Granli, 2003); tens of different vo-
calisations have been recorded (Langbauer, 2000; Poole, 
Payne, Langbauer Jr, & Moss, 1988); and chemical signals 
are known to accurately indicate sexual states in both males 
and females (Rasmussen & Schulte, 1998). Although recog-
nition of most of the visual and vocal displays has not been 
formally tested, the fact that so many distinct signals exist 
is suggestive of subtle discrimination learning and elaborate 
categorisation. Where playback experiments have been used 
to test reactions, this notion has been supported (McComb, 
Moss, Sayialel, & Baker, 2000; Poole, 1999). From their re-
actions, it was clear that elephant calls convey information 
about musth state, and some information about the caller, 
at least familiarity and perhaps individual identity. Thus, al-
though primates have been tested much more extensively in 
this area, there is reason to think that knowledge of features 
and categories that can be learnt by elephants, and their abil-
ity to categorize and classify entities in the world, may at 
least match those of any primate.
Quantities
 Rensch (1957) presented his five year-old female Asian 
elephant with number discriminations: she was able to dis-
tinguish 3 from 4 dots regardless of their arrangement and 
spread. Irie-Sugimoto et al (2008) tested the relative quantity 
judgements of Asian elephants. They presented five captive 
Asian elephants with two baskets containing different quan-
tities of food, and the elephant had to choose the basket with 
the larger amount. All five elephants chose the larger quan-
tity significantly more often than the smaller, performing 
with 67-89% accuracy. Elephants were as good at picking 
the larger quantity when it was only slightly bigger (e.g. 6:5) 
than when it was considerably bigger (e.g. 5:1), and perfor-
mance did not vary with the total number of items present-
ed, up to 12. In a second experiment, four additional Asian 
elephants watched and listened to the baskets being baited, 
but they could not see the final amounts in the baskets. All 
elephants chose the basket containing the larger amount, sig-
nificantly more often than expected by chance, performing 
at 72-82% accuracy.  As in the first experiment, the elephants 
did not exhibit disparity or magnitude effects, in which per-
formance declines with a smaller difference between quanti-
ties, or the total quantity increases, respectively, in striking 
contrast to the performance of great apes and even human 
infants in similar relative quantity judgement tests (see An-
derson, Stoinski, Bloomsmith, & Maple, 2007; Beran, 2001; 
Boysen, Bernston, & Mukobi, 2001; Feigenson, Carey, & 
Hauser, 2002; Xu & Spelke, 2000). It is not yet known what 
cognitive mechanisms underlie the Asian elephants’ numeri-
cal ability, but it may be that elephants are able to keep track 
of a larger number of items in immediate, working memory 
than can great apes including humans, and that when relative 
quantity judgements of larger numbers of items are explored 
then disparity and magnitude effects will emerge. If so, then 
there is a clear parallel with the ability of African savannah 
elephants to keep track of the movements and positions of a 
remarkable number of family members. Indeed, the unusual 
numerical abilities of elephants may derive, in evolutionary 
terms, from the elephant’s need to monitor and coordinate 
movement of their extensive families.
 
The social environment
Knowing about others and their interactions
 Whilst individual recognition is considered an important 
component of animal social life, experimental demonstra-
tions of the ability are relatively sparse. Monkey and ape 
species, however, are known to understand both the direct 
and third party relationships of others (Cheney & Seyfarth, 
1990), and alliances and coalitions with specific individuals 
are a prominent feature of monkey and ape sociality (Har-
court & deWaal, 1992).  Note that knowledge of third party 
relationships is not restricted to large brained species. Some 
fish and bird species have also been found able to track the 
relative relationships of third parties, through what has been 
termed ‘eavesdropping’ on the behaviour of others (e.g. 
Oliveira, McGregor, & Latruffe, 1998; Otter, et al., 1999). 
 Our urine-moving experiments, discussed above, showed 
that elephants have knowledge of individual identities, and 
are able to recognise and keep track of at least 17 differ-
ent female family members (Bates, et al., 2008b). McComb 
et al (2000), using experimental play back of long-distance 
contact calls in the same Amboseli population, showed that 
each adult female elephant was familiar with the contact-
call vocalisations of individuals in an average of 14 families 
in the population, totalling around 100 elephants. When the 
calls were from a familiar family, i.e. one that had previously 
been shown to have a high association index with the test 
group, the test elephants contact-called in response and ap-
proached the location of the loudspeaker. When a test group 
heard unfamiliar contact calls (from groups with a low asso-
ciation index with the test group), their spatial cohesion in-
creased, and they retreated from the area. Whether this vocal 
familiarity is based on individual recognition is uncertain, 
however. It currently remains untested whether elephants 
understand and take advantage of third-party relationships.
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 Field observations of African elephants show clear co-
alitions and alliances (Bates, et al., 2008a; Moss & Poole, 
1983), but reciprocity is less clear – there may be an ele-
ment of this in the formation of coalitions, but it has not been 
demonstrated formally. Asian logging elephants frequently 
work together to roll heavy logs up ramps, which is certainly 
cooperative, but they have been trained to work like this so 
may not themselves understand the cooperation (Rensch, 
1957). 
 Cooperative problem solving is observed fairly regularly 
in long-term behavioural studies of African elephants (Moss, 
1988). For example, two or more individuals may work to-
gether to help individuals that are trapped by muddy river 
banks or drainage ditches (Bates, et al., 2008a), or to chase 
off vehicles when an individual is darted for veterinary pur-
poses (Moss, personal observation). In the Amboseli popu-
lation, related individuals have also been observed to form 
coalitions when attempting to retrieve infants that have been 
commandeered by other, unrelated families (Moss, personal 
observation), and this could also be viewed as cooperative 
problem solving. 
Social strategies and communication
 African savannah elephants are known to have an exten-
sive gestural and vocal repertoire (Poole & Granli, 2003). 
Moreover, as previously noted, they discriminate the contact 
calls of familiar and strange individuals (McComb, et al., 
2000). Social knowledge apparently accrues with age: old 
females have the best knowledge of the contact calls of other 
family groups (McComb, Moss, Durant, Baker, & Sayialel, 
2001). Monkey and ape vocalizations sometimes encode 
‘functionally referential’ information, that is, hearers  react 
to the calls in the same way as they would to entities in the 
world, such as specific predators (Seyfarth, Cheney, & Mar-
ler, 1980; Zuberbuhler, 2000). Whether anything similar is 
latent in elephant vocalizations, however, is unknown. 
 Deception and manipulation have been hot topics in pri-
mate work since the 1980s (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; de Waal, 
1982). Deceptive tactics have been reported in all taxa of 
primates, with frequency of use well predicted by the spe-
cies’ neocortex size (Byrne & Corp, 2004), and in great ape 
species at least some deception appears to be done intention-
ally, with some understanding of others’ mental states (By-
rne & Whiten, 1992). In elephants, there is only one report of 
possible deception (Morris, 1986): certain captive elephants 
in a zoo were noted to finish their ration of hay quickly, and 
then move near others still eating, swinging their trunks in 
an ‘aimless’ manner, but occasionally eating some of their 
hay. It is not clear, however, whether the trunk-swinging 
was used tactically, and whether the other elephants were 
deceived. Researchers on wild populations report no decep-
tion at all, so it may be that the extensive social network of 
elephants renders deception an inappropriate way for them 
to manipulate others.
Social learning 
 Although as yet there are no formal studies of social learn-
ing in elephants, or observations of behavioural traditions, it 
would be unwise to conclude that such a long-lived, slowly 
maturing, highly social species does not learn through ob-
serving group members. The impressive spatial knowledge 
shown in some populations, for instance, is surely acquired 
by young individuals from following older, more knowl-
edgeable relatives. 
 Elephants may eventually be shown to possess social 
learning abilities absent in non-human primates. For in-
stance, there is some evidence of vocal imitation in African 
elephants (Poole, Tyack, Stoeger-Horwath, & Watwood, 
2005), and even one intriguing report of a captive Asian ele-
phant copying human speech, although this has not yet been 
formally verified. Non-human primates lack any significant 
abilities in vocal imitation (Janik & Slater, 1997). Also, cur-
rently unpublished data suggests that older female African 
elephants may teach young, naïve, nulliparous females how 
to behave when they come into oestrous for the first time 
(Bates et al, in preparation). Despite some suggestive obser-
vations (Boesch, 1991), there is no consensus that any spe-
cies of non-human primate is able to teach (Caro & Hauser, 
1992; Thornton & Raihani, 2008) 
 Thus, while there is little evidence on which to compare 
the social learning skills of elephants directly with those of 
the extensively studied primates, this is representative of a 
lack of research effort on the topic rather than a lack of social 
learning ability in elephants. Reports of vocal imitation and 
potential teaching behaviour suggest this is one area where 
greater research effort could prove particularly fruitful and 
instructive. 
Theory of Mind
 Studies of primate cognition that are embraced by the 
portmanteau term ‘theory of mind’ include those on under-
standing the gaze and perception of others, understanding in-
tentions and attention, understanding knowledge and beliefs, 
and understanding the self. There has been much speculation 
as to the cognitive underpinnings of theory of mind and self-
recognition abilities, but as yet there is no consensus (Byrne 
& Bates, 2006; Gallup, 1985; Povinelli & Vonk, 2003; To-
masello, Call, & Hare, 2003).
 There is experimental evidence that many species of pri-
mate follow gaze, even where the gaze is directed behind ob-
structions (Tomasello, Hare, & Agnetta, 1999). Puzzlingly, 
individuals of the same species often fail to give evidence 
that they can use gaze as a cue to object choice, but recent 
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work suggests a resolution. Lemurs were found to use gaze 
successfully as a cue, by following gaze and then choosing 
objects in the direction they were looking, a tendency that 
the researchers called ‘gaze priming’ (Ruiz, Gómez, Roeder, 
& Byrne, 2009). However, neither gaze following nor gaze 
priming were done rigidly and success rates were relatively 
low, perhaps explaining apparent failures in  earlier work 
that did not test gaze following and cueing in the same task. 
In addition, field observations suggest that monkeys and 
apes are able to understand the geometric perspective of oth-
ers (Byrne & Whiten, 1992); this has been confirmed ex-
perimentally only in the case of the chimpanzee (Hare, Call, 
Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000). The observational data, based 
on collated records of deception, also implied that only apes 
are able to take account of the knowledge of competitors 
(Byrne & Whiten, 1992). Again, this was finally confirmed 
experimentally in the case of the chimpanzee (Hare, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2001; Tomasello, et al., 2003) and the orangutan 
(Cartmill & Byrne, 2007), after several years of explicit de-
nials of the possibility (Povinelli, 1993; Povinelli & Eddy, 
1996; Tomasello & Call, 1997). 
 An intriguingly similar distribution of ability across pri-
mate phylogeny has also been uncovered by study of ani-
mal reactions to mirrors. Most animals plainly cannot learn 
to understand the operation of mirrors: continuing to make 
social responses, as if to another individual of their species, 
or habituating to mirrors altogether and paying no further at-
tention to them. Monkeys, however, do learn to understand 
the geometric properties of mirrors, using them to detect the 
presence of individuals that appear behind them, or to reach 
food rewards more successfully by locating their reflection 
in a mirror (Anderson, 1984).  However, they signally fail 
to recognize a reflection of their own face as such, despite 
extensive experience. In contrast, members of all species of 
great apes can learn to interpret a mirror reflection or CCTV 
image of their face as ‘themselves’, although not all individ-
uals ever do so (Gallup, Jnr, 1970, 1982; Patterson & Cohn, 
1994). 
 Recent analysis of behavioural records of the African sa-
vannah elephants of Amboseli NP suggests that they under-
stand the emotions and the intended goals of others, acting 
empathically towards individuals who are distressed and 
helping them in ways that were appropriate to their predica-
ment (Bates, et al., 2008a).  A description of the reactions 
to a dying and subsequently dead matriarch by both fam-
ily members and unrelated elephants further suggests that 
elephants can act empathically (Douglas-Hamilton et al, 
2006). However, Bates et al (2008a) did not find any posi-
tive evidence for the capacity to understand others’ attention, 
knowledge or beliefs. The same could be said of field studies 
of apes, so explicit tests of elephants’ understanding of oth-
ers’ mental states may be worthwhile. 
 Nissani (2004) modified experiments devised by Povi-
nelli and Eddy (1996) to examine what two zoo-based Asian 
elephants understood about visual attention. Povinelli and 
Eddy had found that chimpanzees chose to beg from a per-
son whose whole body was oriented toward them rather than 
oriented away, and these two elephants performed similarly. 
However, chimpanzees did not discriminate between people 
according to their head orientation alone: for instance, when 
offered a choice between two people standing sideways-on, 
one with the head turned 90 degrees to look at the chimpan-
zee subject, and one not, or between two people both whole 
body oriented toward them but one with the face covered or 
with a bucket over their head, the chimpanzees performed at 
chance. Nissani gave 8 trials of each sort to each of the two 
elephants, and none of the results were individually signifi-
cant. However, with sideways body presentation it appeared 
that the elephants were able to take account of the person’s 
face orientation (6/8 and 7/8 trials successful, respectively).
It may indeed be that straight copies of studies used with 
monkeys and apes are systematically unsuitable for probing 
elephant cognition; new and creative experimental designs 
may be required.  Monkeys and apes predominantly use vi-
sion to learn about the social world. For elephants, audition 
and olfaction are demonstrably more important than vision, 
with comparatively much larger brain areas dedicated to these 
Figure 2. Collecting earth soaked with recently-deposited 
urine, for use in conducting “expectancy violation” experi-
ments at Amboseli. The presence of an individual is artifi-
cially simulated by moving urine deposits. Photograph by 
the authors.
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areas than visual cortex (Hakeem, et al., 2005; Shoshani, et 
al., 2006). It therefore seems probable that tests using audi-
tory or olfactory stimuli will be more relevant to elephants, 
and more likely to accurately measure their mental abilities.
 One area in which it will not be possible to avoid the visu-
al domain is that of mirror self-recognition; accounts of two 
tests in Asian elephants have been published, with somewhat 
contradictory results. Both relied on Gallup’s (1970) ‘mark 
test’ paradigm. In this, the subject is first given extensive 
experience with a mirror. If signs of self-recognition are ob-
served, such as self-monitoring while making repetitive or 
unusual movements, then the mark test is applied. Surrep-
titiously, for instance while the subject is anaesthetized, a 
conspicuous mark is applied to its body in two places, one 
visible directly and one not.  The subject is then observed for 
a period without access to a mirror, to control for the possi-
bility that the marks can be detected by scent or tactile sen-
sation. Provided the subject examines only the visible mark, 
and not the concealed one, the mirror is then restored. Then, 
once the subject catches sight of its image in the mirror, the 
critical observation – seen in many great apes – is that it 
suddenly touches and explores the concealed mark, while 
monitoring the mirror to guide its hands. Povinelli (1989) 
followed this procedure when testing two elephants: how-
ever, he observed no signs of self-recognition and both indi-
viduals subsequently failed the mark test (see also Nissani & 
Hoefler-Nissani, 2007). He concluded that Asian elephants 
do not show self-recognition. However, these elephants were 
only given a few days exposure to the mirror prior to testing; 
chimpanzees that have passed the mark test have typically 
had weeks or months of prior mirror exposure. In the sec-
ond experiment, because their three elephants could not be 
separated, Plotnik et al (2006) used sham marking to control 
for the possibility that the subjects might be able to detect 
a mark by non-visual means. They report that one of three 
adult females they tested did show mirror self-recognition: 
she touched the visible mark several times, but never the 
sham mark. Moreover, all three elephants showed sugges-
tive behaviour in front of the mirror, prior to any marking, 
most strikingly cases where “the elephant is standing AT the 
mirror, and moves its head in and out of mirror view, like a 
kid playing with his mirror image by running in and out of 
view of it” (Josh Plotnik, personal comm.). However, with 
only one subject giving a positive response to the mark test, 
it is crucial that this response should be a convincing one. 
The initial response shown by the ‘successful’ elephant, af-
ter spending time in front of the mirror, was to walk away 
for 7 minutes. Then she returned and moved in and out of 
mirror-view a couple of times, then moved away again, still 
having shown no mark-touching. Finally, she moved away 
from the mirror and only then, when away from the mirror 
did she first touch the mark with her trunk. This pattern is 
so different to that observed in the great apes that recognize 
themselves in mirrors that it cannot be considered definitive; 
but we suspect that future data will show that elephants do 
indeed have the competence to recognize themselves in a 
mirror.
Summary
 A recurring theme throughout this survey has been the 
stringent limitations on the extent to which elephant and pri-
mate cognition can be satisfactorily compared. It is not just 
that less is known, for both practical and historical reasons, 
about elephant cognition, although that is certainly true. 
But in addition the positive things that we do know about 
cognition within the two families are often hard to com-
pare. Repeatedly, the ready availability, ease of manipula-
tion and straightforward motivation of captive primates has 
enabled experiments to be done which are not easily done 
with elephants, and have yet to be attempted. At other times, 
experiments with elephants have revealed abilities that are 
not proven with primates; for instance, our studies with ol-
factory social stimuli enabled demonstration of individual 
identity recognition in elephants, an ability not so far shown 
experimentally in primates. Yet the differences we have re-
viewed are often more likely, perhaps, to reflect differences 
in study methods and facilities available than to point to any 
profound difference in cognition.
 Undoubtedly, elephants perform well on laboratory tests 
of learning, discrimination and memory, and spontaneously 
engage in simple forms of tool use – no obvious differences 
from primates are apparent here. Similarly, it seems likely 
that elephants, like the great apes, have the cognitive ca-
pacity to recognize themselves in a mirror. When it comes 
to categorization, some intriguing findings have recently 
emerged that may point to capacities unusual for mammals. 
In number discrimination, elephants like primates are able to 
distinguish quite small quantity differences – yet strangely 
they showed no effect of the size difference in making their 
judgements, nor any variation in performance with the total 
number of items presented. One possibility is that this lack 
of disparity and magnitude effects is a result of unusually 
large working memory capacity: for elephants, even groups 
of 5-6 items can be appreciated and compared in the man-
ner that humans and other great apes can appreciate groups 
of 2-3. Wild elephants have been shown to sub-categorize 
humans into groups according to the varying levels of risk 
to them that different groups present, and to make this cat-
egorization on the basis of scent or colour, independently. 
In the social realm, there is no doubt that elephants show 
empathy into the problems faced by others as well as react-
ing to their expressed emotions, but much more work needs 
to be done before the initial hints of elephant abilities in 
cooperation, imitation and teaching can be properly under-
stood.  In contrast to the lack of any special signs of cogni-
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tive ability in laboratory tests of memory, data from the field 
suggest that the elephant’s vaunted reputation for memory 
may have a basis in fact, in two ways. Faced by the need 
to remember spatial information over very long periods, for 
instance the locations of waterholes in a desert, it is thought 
that elephants are able to re-find, over vast distances, places 
not visited for many years: elephants may be specialized for 
cognitive mapping. And in the immediate social realm, the 
ability to keep track of the current locations of 17 or more 
family members also seems remarkable. As with the data on 
quantity judgements, one possibility is that elephant work-
ing memory is larger than in humans or other great apes. 
 We finish with two speculations. First, we doubt that it is a 
coincidence that the tests giving the strongest positive results 
so far are those based on abilities elephants show naturally in 
the wild, whereas tests that do not perhaps lend themselves 
to the natural environments of elephants have often been in-
conclusive. Thus, in order to go beyond the somewhat sparse 
picture we have painted here, and explore elephant cogni-
tive skills in causal reasoning, social learning, and theory of 
mind, we suspect that investigation using ecologically valid 
stimuli will be required.  Second, if elephant and primate 
cognition do indeed prove to be similar in many ways, as 
still seems entirely possible, a convincing explanation will 
be needed. Elephants are more closely related to aardvarks, 
hyraxes and dugongs than they are to primates (Murphy, et 
al., 2001): by contrast, rats and people are close cousins. 
Any coincidence in cognitive skills between elephants and 
primates, therefore, points to convergent evolution for spe-
cific abilities, so the future study of elephant cognition offers 
the potential to understand better the evolutionary forces that 
select for particular mental skills. 
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